Editing 75-02-B6 (section)

=== Transcript ===
Should the United States recognize [[wikipedia:China|Red China]]? If so what's in it for us and what's in it for the Chinese. I'll be right back.

Too often in our pursuit of detente, we act as if a concession on our side is automatically helpful to the process as a whole. But if you think about it, nothing could make detente less meaningful, either to the United States or to the populations of the communist nations, than an unending series of one-sided American concessions. If our adversaries can get what they want, formal recognition, liberalized trade, technical help, what have you, without making any modifications in their foreign domestic policies, then the basis for true friendship is erased. It's only by a change in the nature of communism, a movement away from the policies of aggression abroad and repression at home, that communism and the west will be able to live together in harmony. If the communists get the prestige and material aid they want without having to change any of their own policies, the seeds of future conflict will be continually nourished, ready to sprout anew with little or no warning.

It seems to me that before making new concessions, our policymakers need to nail down, not just on paper, but in their own minds exactly what it is we're getting in return. This applies in particular to the recognition of Red China, a move which would involve the downgrading of our relations with the [[wikipedia:Taiwan|Republic of China on Taiwan]], which is a major trading partner and one of the most stable prosperous Asian countries. Despite its severe political setbacks of the past two years in the United Nations and elsewhere, the Republic of China has emerged from a difficult period in robust economic health and with renewed political vigor.

In the Far East, the concept of face is important. Recognition of the communist regime in [[wikipedia:Beijing|Peking]] and downgrading of relations with [[wikipedia:Taipei|Taipei]] is therefore a matter of great importance to the nations involved, and thus to us. We should not make such a move in the absence of concrete concessions from Peking. In the long run, no concession is more important than a relaxation of China's brutal policy toward its own people with the victory of Premier [[wikipedia:Zhou_Enlai|Chou En-lai]] and his so-called moderate allies in the recent communist party conference, promises have been made to the Chinese people.

Along these lines, under a [[wikipedia:1975_Constitution_of_China|newly adopted constitution]], the people for the first time since the revolution have been given the right to work for themselves and for their families benefit. Industrial workers can moonlight. Peasants can cultivate private plots. In the political realm there's to be less emphasis on strict conformity the party line and more freedom to speak out. These moves come in the heels of warnings by the Chou faction that a continuation of the cruel repression favored by party chairman [[wikipedia:Mao_Zedong|Mao Zedoung]] could lead to overthrow of the government, thus the present relaxation may be more a matter of political survival than increased benevolence.

Whatever the motives we should welcome these steps and wait a considerable time to see whether they're implemented. This is especially important when we consider the advanced age and in some cases illness of China's current leadership and the chronic instability of China's politics in recent years. And we should be exacting a much tougher price in China's external policies. It's easy to talk a friendship with the United States when at the same time you're free to threaten war with Taiwan and to fund terrorist liberation movements in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and elsewhere. Before we even think about recognition of the Peking government we should make sure their deeds match their words.

This is Ronald Reagan.

Thanks for listening.

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