75-03-A2 - Revision history

Reagan admin at 02:33, 21 February 2026

2026-02-21T02:33:41Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 02:33, 21 February 2026
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	The [[Wikipedia:Soviet_Union\|Soviet Union]]'s recent cancellation of the [[nyt:1972/10/19/archives/us-and-russians-sign-agreements-to-widen-trade-accords-ending.html\|1972 trade agreement]] raises anew all the confusing and serious questions in people's minds about our policy of detente. What, if anything, should the United States be looking for in exchange for trade, aid, and other concessions? There are some who believe that we should grant favors to our adversaries with no strings attached, not so much for the sake of being kind as in the hope that unilateral concessions will create a climate of trust between the two countries and encourage the Russians to make unilateral conciliatory moves of their own.		The [[Wikipedia:Soviet_Union\|Soviet Union]]'s recent cancellation of the [[nyt:1972/10/19/archives/us-and-russians-sign-agreements-to-widen-trade-accords-ending.html\|1972 trade agreement]] raises anew all the confusing and serious questions in people's minds about our policy of detente. What, if anything, should the United States be looking for in exchange for trade, aid, and other concessions? There are some who believe that we should grant favors to our adversaries with no strings attached, not so much for the sake of being kind as in the hope that unilateral concessions will create a climate of trust between the two countries and encourage the Russians to make unilateral conciliatory moves of their own.

	History provides very little encouragement for this strategy. The Soviet leaders from [[wikipedia:Lenin\|Lenin]] to [[wikipedia:Leonid_Brezhnev\|Brezhnev]] have been realistic unsentimental bargainers men, highly reluctant to pay for something offered free of charge. Indeed, it's often been after major western concessions, such as the handing over of Eastern Europe to the Red Army at the close of World War II, the Soviet policy immediately afterward assumed its most threatening form. It was the fear that our Soviet trade policy represented just such a unilateral concession, that [[wikipedia:Henry_M._Jackson\|Senator Henry Jackson]] and others in Congress [[wikipedia:Jackson–Vanik_amendment\|attached a rider]] to [[wikipedia:Trade_Act_of_1974\|the foreign trade act]], making the concessions dependent on Soviet agreement, to allow freer immigration by Jews and other oppressed people, the condition was at first agreed to. The Soviets then repudiated only a few months later thus canceling the whole agreement. This led to an attack on Congress by Secretary of State Kissinger, whose view is that the United States should ask only for Soviet concessions in foreign policy and defense, but never for domestic relaxation in the Soviet Union itself.		History provides very little encouragement for this strategy. The Soviet leaders from [[wikipedia:Lenin\|Lenin]] to [[wikipedia:Leonid_Brezhnev\|Brezhnev]] have been realistic unsentimental bargainers men, highly reluctant to pay for something offered free of charge. Indeed, it's often been after major western concessions, such as the handing over of Eastern Europe to the Red Army at the close of World War II, the Soviet policy immediately afterward assumed its most threatening form. It was the fear that our Soviet trade policy represented just such a unilateral concession, that [[wikipedia:Henry_M._Jackson\|Senator Henry Jackson]] and others in Congress [[wikipedia:Jackson–Vanik_amendment\|attached a rider]] to [[wikipedia:Trade_Act_of_1974\|the foreign trade act]], making the concessions dependent on Soviet agreement, to allow freer immigration by Jews and other oppressed people, the condition was at first agreed to. The Soviets then repudiated only a few months later thus canceling the whole agreement. This led to an attack on Congress by Secretary of State [[wikipedia:Henry_Kissinger\|Kissinger]], whose view is that the United States should ask only for Soviet concessions in foreign policy and defense, but never for domestic relaxation in the Soviet Union itself.

	Kissinger believes that any quid pro quo that smacks of interference in internal Soviet affairs will never be granted, but the immigration agreement was initially granted, indicating that important elements in Soviet leadership do consider internal issues negotiable. Moreover, there's little indication that the Soviets have conceded many points, in such matters as nuclear arms limitation or the Mideast in exchange for American concessions in other fields. This is understandable. Vital issues of national security and big power maneuvering must inevitably be approached in terms of mutual security and balance of power. Negotiations on peace matters will succeed only if the United States shows a willingness to match and exceed Soviet power. Should negotiations fail, that leaves internal Soviet policy as virtually the only area of valuable Soviet concession. After all, the Soviets have very little of what we want in the way of technology and it's unlikely we'd wish to become dependent on them for raw materials, when many other sources are available.		Kissinger believes that any quid pro quo that smacks of interference in internal Soviet affairs will never be granted, but the immigration agreement was initially granted, indicating that important elements in Soviet leadership do consider internal issues negotiable. Moreover, there's little indication that the Soviets have conceded many points, in such matters as nuclear arms limitation or the Mideast in exchange for American concessions in other fields. This is understandable. Vital issues of national security and big power maneuvering must inevitably be approached in terms of mutual security and balance of power. Negotiations on peace matters will succeed only if the United States shows a willingness to match and exceed Soviet power. Should negotiations fail, that leaves internal Soviet policy as virtually the only area of valuable Soviet concession. After all, the Soviets have very little of what we want in the way of technology and it's unlikely we'd wish to become dependent on them for raw materials, when many other sources are available.

Reagan admin at 21:55, 20 February 2026

2026-02-20T21:55:59Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:55, 20 February 2026
Line 12:		Line 12:
	The [[Wikipedia:Soviet_Union\|Soviet Union]]'s recent cancellation of the [[nyt:1972/10/19/archives/us-and-russians-sign-agreements-to-widen-trade-accords-ending.html\|1972 trade agreement]] raises anew all the confusing and serious questions in people's minds about our policy of detente. What, if anything, should the United States be looking for in exchange for trade, aid, and other concessions? There are some who believe that we should grant favors to our adversaries with no strings attached, not so much for the sake of being kind as in the hope that unilateral concessions will create a climate of trust between the two countries and encourage the Russians to make unilateral conciliatory moves of their own.		The [[Wikipedia:Soviet_Union\|Soviet Union]]'s recent cancellation of the [[nyt:1972/10/19/archives/us-and-russians-sign-agreements-to-widen-trade-accords-ending.html\|1972 trade agreement]] raises anew all the confusing and serious questions in people's minds about our policy of detente. What, if anything, should the United States be looking for in exchange for trade, aid, and other concessions? There are some who believe that we should grant favors to our adversaries with no strings attached, not so much for the sake of being kind as in the hope that unilateral concessions will create a climate of trust between the two countries and encourage the Russians to make unilateral conciliatory moves of their own.

	History provides very little encouragement for this strategy. The Soviet leaders from [[wikipedia:Lenin\|Lenin]] to [[wikipedia:Leonid_Brezhnev\|Brezhnev]] have been realistic unsentimental bargainers men, highly reluctant to pay for something offered free of charge. Indeed, it's often been after major western concessions, such as the handing over of Eastern Europe to the Red Army at the close of World War II, the Soviet policy immediately afterward assumed its most threatening form. It was the fear that our Soviet trade policy represented just such a unilateral concession, that [[wikipedia:Henry_M._Jackson\|Senator Henry Jackson]] and others in Congress attached a rider to the foreign trade act, making the concessions dependent on Soviet agreement, to allow freer immigration by Jews and other oppressed people, the condition was at first agreed to. The Soviets then repudiated only a few months later thus canceling the whole agreement. This led to an attack on Congress by Secretary of State Kissinger, whose view is that the United States should ask only for Soviet concessions in foreign policy and defense, but never for domestic relaxation in the Soviet Union itself.		History provides very little encouragement for this strategy. The Soviet leaders from [[wikipedia:Lenin\|Lenin]] to [[wikipedia:Leonid_Brezhnev\|Brezhnev]] have been realistic unsentimental bargainers men, highly reluctant to pay for something offered free of charge. Indeed, it's often been after major western concessions, such as the handing over of Eastern Europe to the Red Army at the close of World War II, the Soviet policy immediately afterward assumed its most threatening form. It was the fear that our Soviet trade policy represented just such a unilateral concession, that [[wikipedia:Henry_M._Jackson\|Senator Henry Jackson]] and others in Congress [[wikipedia:Jackson–Vanik_amendment\|attached a rider]] to [[wikipedia:Trade_Act_of_1974\|the foreign trade act]], making the concessions dependent on Soviet agreement, to allow freer immigration by Jews and other oppressed people, the condition was at first agreed to. The Soviets then repudiated only a few months later thus canceling the whole agreement. This led to an attack on Congress by Secretary of State Kissinger, whose view is that the United States should ask only for Soviet concessions in foreign policy and defense, but never for domestic relaxation in the Soviet Union itself.

	Kissinger believes that any quid pro quo that smacks of interference in internal Soviet affairs will never be granted, but the immigration agreement was initially granted, indicating that important elements in Soviet leadership do consider internal issues negotiable. Moreover, there's little indication that the Soviets have conceded many points, in such matters as nuclear arms limitation or the Mideast in exchange for American concessions in other fields. This is understandable. Vital issues of national security and big power maneuvering must inevitably be approached in terms of mutual security and balance of power. Negotiations on peace matters will succeed only if the United States shows a willingness to match and exceed Soviet power. Should negotiations fail, that leaves internal Soviet policy as virtually the only area of valuable Soviet concession. After all, the Soviets have very little of what we want in the way of technology and it's unlikely we'd wish to become dependent on them for raw materials, when many other sources are available.		Kissinger believes that any quid pro quo that smacks of interference in internal Soviet affairs will never be granted, but the immigration agreement was initially granted, indicating that important elements in Soviet leadership do consider internal issues negotiable. Moreover, there's little indication that the Soviets have conceded many points, in such matters as nuclear arms limitation or the Mideast in exchange for American concessions in other fields. This is understandable. Vital issues of national security and big power maneuvering must inevitably be approached in terms of mutual security and balance of power. Negotiations on peace matters will succeed only if the United States shows a willingness to match and exceed Soviet power. Should negotiations fail, that leaves internal Soviet policy as virtually the only area of valuable Soviet concession. After all, the Soviets have very little of what we want in the way of technology and it's unlikely we'd wish to become dependent on them for raw materials, when many other sources are available.
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	<TR><TD VALIGN="TOP">		<TR><TD VALIGN="TOP">
	===Added Notes===		===Added Notes===
	* The rider mentioned may be the [[wikipedia:Jackson–Vanik_amendment\|Jackson-Vanik Amendment]]
	</TD></TR>		</TD></TR>
	</TABLE>		</TABLE>

Reagan admin at 21:54, 20 February 2026

2026-02-20T21:54:31Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:54, 20 February 2026
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	<TR><TD VALIGN="TOP">		<TR><TD VALIGN="TOP">
	===Added Notes===		===Added Notes===
	* The rider mentioned may be the [[~~wikpedia~~:Jackson–Vanik_amendment\|Jackson-Vanik Amendment]]		* The rider mentioned may be the [[wikipedia:Jackson–Vanik_amendment\|Jackson-Vanik Amendment]]
	</TD></TR>		</TD></TR>
	</TABLE>		</TABLE>

Reagan admin at 21:53, 20 February 2026

2026-02-20T21:53:57Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:53, 20 February 2026
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	The [[Wikipedia:Soviet_Union\|Soviet Union]]'s recent cancellation of the [[nyt:1972/10/19/archives/us-and-russians-sign-agreements-to-widen-trade-accords-ending.html\|1972 trade agreement]] raises anew all the confusing and serious questions in people's minds about our policy of detente. What, if anything, should the United States be looking for in exchange for trade, aid, and other concessions? There are some who believe that we should grant favors to our adversaries with no strings attached, not so much for the sake of being kind as in the hope that unilateral concessions will create a climate of trust between the two countries and encourage the Russians to make unilateral conciliatory moves of their own.		The [[Wikipedia:Soviet_Union\|Soviet Union]]'s recent cancellation of the [[nyt:1972/10/19/archives/us-and-russians-sign-agreements-to-widen-trade-accords-ending.html\|1972 trade agreement]] raises anew all the confusing and serious questions in people's minds about our policy of detente. What, if anything, should the United States be looking for in exchange for trade, aid, and other concessions? There are some who believe that we should grant favors to our adversaries with no strings attached, not so much for the sake of being kind as in the hope that unilateral concessions will create a climate of trust between the two countries and encourage the Russians to make unilateral conciliatory moves of their own.

	History provides very little encouragement for this strategy. The Soviet leaders from [[wikipedia:\|Lenin]] to Brezhnev have been realistic unsentimental bargainers men, highly reluctant to pay for something offered free of charge. Indeed, it's often been after major western concessions, such as the handing over of Eastern Europe to the ~~red army~~ at the close of World War II, the Soviet policy immediately afterward assumed its most threatening form. It was the fear that our Soviet trade policy represented just such a unilateral concession, that ~~senator~~ Henry Jackson and others in Congress attached a rider to the foreign trade act, making the concessions dependent on Soviet agreement, to allow freer immigration by Jews and other oppressed people, the condition was at first agreed to. The Soviets then repudiated only a few months later thus canceling the whole agreement. This led to an attack on Congress by Secretary of State Kissinger, whose view is that the United States should ask only for Soviet concessions in foreign policy and defense, but never for domestic relaxation in the Soviet Union itself.		History provides very little encouragement for this strategy. The Soviet leaders from [[wikipedia:Lenin\|Lenin]] to [[wikipedia:Leonid_Brezhnev\|Brezhnev]] have been realistic unsentimental bargainers men, highly reluctant to pay for something offered free of charge. Indeed, it's often been after major western concessions, such as the handing over of Eastern Europe to the Red Army at the close of World War II, the Soviet policy immediately afterward assumed its most threatening form. It was the fear that our Soviet trade policy represented just such a unilateral concession, that [[wikipedia:Henry_M._Jackson\|Senator Henry Jackson]] and others in Congress attached a rider to the foreign trade act, making the concessions dependent on Soviet agreement, to allow freer immigration by Jews and other oppressed people, the condition was at first agreed to. The Soviets then repudiated only a few months later thus canceling the whole agreement. This led to an attack on Congress by Secretary of State Kissinger, whose view is that the United States should ask only for Soviet concessions in foreign policy and defense, but never for domestic relaxation in the Soviet Union itself.

	Kissinger believes that any quid pro quo that smacks of interference in internal Soviet affairs will never be granted, but the immigration agreement was initially granted, indicating that important elements in Soviet leadership do consider internal issues negotiable. Moreover, there's little indication that the Soviets have conceded many points, in such matters as nuclear arms limitation or the Mideast in exchange for American concessions in other fields. This is understandable. Vital issues of national security and big power maneuvering must inevitably be approached in terms of mutual security and balance of power. Negotiations on peace matters will succeed only if the United States shows a willingness to match and exceed Soviet power. Should negotiations fail, that leaves internal Soviet policy as virtually the only area of valuable Soviet concession. After all, the Soviets have very little of what we want in the way of technology and it's unlikely we'd wish to become dependent on them for raw materials, when many other sources are available.		Kissinger believes that any quid pro quo that smacks of interference in internal Soviet affairs will never be granted, but the immigration agreement was initially granted, indicating that important elements in Soviet leadership do consider internal issues negotiable. Moreover, there's little indication that the Soviets have conceded many points, in such matters as nuclear arms limitation or the Mideast in exchange for American concessions in other fields. This is understandable. Vital issues of national security and big power maneuvering must inevitably be approached in terms of mutual security and balance of power. Negotiations on peace matters will succeed only if the United States shows a willingness to match and exceed Soviet power. Should negotiations fail, that leaves internal Soviet policy as virtually the only area of valuable Soviet concession. After all, the Soviets have very little of what we want in the way of technology and it's unlikely we'd wish to become dependent on them for raw materials, when many other sources are available.

	We must always remember that the Soviet Union, through the communist parties of the world, is an international corporation, complete with extensive apparatus not only of subversion but of public relations. A black eye, such as the expulsion of [[wikipedia:~~Alexander_Solzhenitsyn~~\|Alexander Solzhenitsyn]] harms Soviet interests around the globe. The more we focus attention on internal Soviet repression and focus our demands in this area, the better chance that over the years the Soviet society will lose its cruelty and secrecy. Peace could then be ensured, not only because the Soviets fear are deterrent but because they no longer wish to blot out all who oppose them at home and abroad.		We must always remember that the Soviet Union, through the communist parties of the world, is an international corporation, complete with extensive apparatus not only of subversion but of public relations. A black eye, such as the expulsion of [[wikipedia:Aleksandr_Solzhenitsyn\|Alexander Solzhenitsyn]] harms Soviet interests around the globe. The more we focus attention on internal Soviet repression and focus our demands in this area, the better chance that over the years the Soviet society will lose its cruelty and secrecy. Peace could then be ensured, not only because the Soviets fear are deterrent but because they no longer wish to blot out all who oppose them at home and abroad.

	This is Ronald Reagan.		This is Ronald Reagan.
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	<TR><TD VALIGN="TOP">		<TR><TD VALIGN="TOP">
	===Added Notes===		===Added Notes===
			* The rider mentioned may be the [[wikpedia:Jackson–Vanik_amendment\|Jackson-Vanik Amendment]]
	</TD></TR>		</TD></TR>
	</TABLE>		</TABLE>

Reagan admin at 21:48, 20 February 2026

2026-02-20T21:48:03Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:48, 20 February 2026
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	What should be the U.S. aim in detente? I'll be right back.		What should be the U.S. aim in detente? I'll be right back.

	The Soviet Union's recent cancellation of the 1972 trade agreement raises anew all the confusing and serious questions in people's minds about our policy of detente. What, if anything, should the United States be looking for in exchange for trade, aid, and other concessions? There are some who believe that we should grant favors to our adversaries with no strings attached, not so much for the sake of being kind as in the hope that unilateral concessions will create a climate of trust between the two countries and encourage the Russians to make unilateral conciliatory moves of their own.		The [[Wikipedia:Soviet_Union\|Soviet Union]]'s recent cancellation of the [[nyt:1972/10/19/archives/us-and-russians-sign-agreements-to-widen-trade-accords-ending.html\|1972 trade agreement]] raises anew all the confusing and serious questions in people's minds about our policy of detente. What, if anything, should the United States be looking for in exchange for trade, aid, and other concessions? There are some who believe that we should grant favors to our adversaries with no strings attached, not so much for the sake of being kind as in the hope that unilateral concessions will create a climate of trust between the two countries and encourage the Russians to make unilateral conciliatory moves of their own.

	History provides very little encouragement for this strategy. The Soviet leaders from Lenin to Brezhnev have been realistic unsentimental bargainers men, highly reluctant to pay for something offered free of charge. Indeed, it's often been after major western concessions, such as the handing over of Eastern Europe to the red army at the close of World War II, the Soviet policy immediately afterward assumed its most threatening form. It was the fear that our Soviet trade policy represented just such a unilateral concession, that senator Henry Jackson and others in Congress attached a rider to the foreign trade act, making the concessions dependent on Soviet agreement, to allow freer immigration by Jews and other oppressed people, the condition was at first agreed to. The Soviets then repudiated only a few months later thus canceling the whole agreement. This led to an attack on Congress by Secretary of State Kissinger, whose view is that the United States should ask only for Soviet concessions in foreign policy and defense, but never for domestic relaxation in the Soviet Union itself.		History provides very little encouragement for this strategy. The Soviet leaders from [[wikipedia:\|Lenin]] to Brezhnev have been realistic unsentimental bargainers men, highly reluctant to pay for something offered free of charge. Indeed, it's often been after major western concessions, such as the handing over of Eastern Europe to the red army at the close of World War II, the Soviet policy immediately afterward assumed its most threatening form. It was the fear that our Soviet trade policy represented just such a unilateral concession, that senator Henry Jackson and others in Congress attached a rider to the foreign trade act, making the concessions dependent on Soviet agreement, to allow freer immigration by Jews and other oppressed people, the condition was at first agreed to. The Soviets then repudiated only a few months later thus canceling the whole agreement. This led to an attack on Congress by Secretary of State Kissinger, whose view is that the United States should ask only for Soviet concessions in foreign policy and defense, but never for domestic relaxation in the Soviet Union itself.

	Kissinger believes that any quid pro quo that smacks of interference in internal Soviet affairs will never be granted, but the immigration agreement was initially granted, indicating that important elements in Soviet leadership do consider internal issues negotiable. Moreover, there's little indication that the Soviets have conceded many points, in such matters as nuclear arms limitation or the Mideast in exchange for American concessions in other fields. This is understandable. Vital issues of national security and big power maneuvering must inevitably be approached in terms of mutual security and balance of power. Negotiations on peace matters will succeed only if the United States shows a willingness to match and exceed Soviet power. Should negotiations fail, that leaves internal Soviet policy as virtually the only area of valuable Soviet concession. After all, the Soviets have very little of what we want in the way of technology and it's unlikely we'd wish to become dependent on them for raw materials, when many other sources are available.		Kissinger believes that any quid pro quo that smacks of interference in internal Soviet affairs will never be granted, but the immigration agreement was initially granted, indicating that important elements in Soviet leadership do consider internal issues negotiable. Moreover, there's little indication that the Soviets have conceded many points, in such matters as nuclear arms limitation or the Mideast in exchange for American concessions in other fields. This is understandable. Vital issues of national security and big power maneuvering must inevitably be approached in terms of mutual security and balance of power. Negotiations on peace matters will succeed only if the United States shows a willingness to match and exceed Soviet power. Should negotiations fail, that leaves internal Soviet policy as virtually the only area of valuable Soviet concession. After all, the Soviets have very little of what we want in the way of technology and it's unlikely we'd wish to become dependent on them for raw materials, when many other sources are available.

	We must always remember that the Soviet Union, through the communist parties of the world, is an international corporation, complete with extensive apparatus not only of subversion but of public relations. A black eye, such as the expulsion of Alexander Solzhenitsyn harms Soviet interests around the globe. The more we focus attention on internal Soviet repression and focus our demands in this area, the better chance that over the years the Soviet society will lose its cruelty and secrecy. Peace could then be ensured, not only because the Soviets fear are deterrent but because they no longer wish to blot out all who oppose them at home and abroad.		We must always remember that the Soviet Union, through the communist parties of the world, is an international corporation, complete with extensive apparatus not only of subversion but of public relations. A black eye, such as the expulsion of [[wikipedia:Alexander_Solzhenitsyn\|Alexander Solzhenitsyn]] harms Soviet interests around the globe. The more we focus attention on internal Soviet repression and focus our demands in this area, the better chance that over the years the Soviet society will lose its cruelty and secrecy. Peace could then be ensured, not only because the Soviets fear are deterrent but because they no longer wish to blot out all who oppose them at home and abroad.

	This is Ronald Reagan.		This is Ronald Reagan.

Reagan admin at 01:17, 14 March 2022

2022-03-14T01:17:49Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 01:17, 14 March 2022
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	<TABLE BORDER="0"><TR><TD WIDTH="60%" ROWSPAN="2">		<TABLE BORDER="0"><TR><TD WIDTH="60%" ROWSPAN="2">
	=== Transcript ===		=== Transcript ===
	~~Not Available yet~~. This ~~code~~ is a ~~placeholder~~.		What should be the U.S. aim in detente? I'll be right back.

			The Soviet Union's recent cancellation of the 1972 trade agreement raises anew all the confusing and serious questions in people's minds about our policy of detente. What, if anything, should the United States be looking for in exchange for trade, aid, and other concessions? There are some who believe that we should grant favors to our adversaries with no strings attached, not so much for the sake of being kind as in the hope that unilateral concessions will create a climate of trust between the two countries and encourage the Russians to make unilateral conciliatory moves of their own.

			History provides very little encouragement for this strategy. The Soviet leaders from Lenin to Brezhnev have been realistic unsentimental bargainers men, highly reluctant to pay for something offered free of charge. Indeed, it's often been after major western concessions, such as the handing over of Eastern Europe to the red army at the close of World War II, the Soviet policy immediately afterward assumed its most threatening form. It was the fear that our Soviet trade policy represented just such a unilateral concession, that senator Henry Jackson and others in Congress attached a rider to the foreign trade act, making the concessions dependent on Soviet agreement, to allow freer immigration by Jews and other oppressed people, the condition was at first agreed to. The Soviets then repudiated only a few months later thus canceling the whole agreement. This led to an attack on Congress by Secretary of State Kissinger, whose view is that the United States should ask only for Soviet concessions in foreign policy and defense, but never for domestic relaxation in the Soviet Union itself.

			Kissinger believes that any quid pro quo that smacks of interference in internal Soviet affairs will never be granted, but the immigration agreement was initially granted, indicating that important elements in Soviet leadership do consider internal issues negotiable. Moreover, there's little indication that the Soviets have conceded many points, in such matters as nuclear arms limitation or the Mideast in exchange for American concessions in other fields. This is understandable. Vital issues of national security and big power maneuvering must inevitably be approached in terms of mutual security and balance of power. Negotiations on peace matters will succeed only if the United States shows a willingness to match and exceed Soviet power. Should negotiations fail, that leaves internal Soviet policy as virtually the only area of valuable Soviet concession. After all, the Soviets have very little of what we want in the way of technology and it's unlikely we'd wish to become dependent on them for raw materials, when many other sources are available.

			We must always remember that the Soviet Union, through the communist parties of the world, is an international corporation, complete with extensive apparatus not only of subversion but of public relations. A black eye, such as the expulsion of Alexander Solzhenitsyn harms Soviet interests around the globe. The more we focus attention on internal Soviet repression and focus our demands in this area, the better chance that over the years the Soviet society will lose its cruelty and secrecy. Peace could then be ensured, not only because the Soviets fear are deterrent but because they no longer wish to blot out all who oppose them at home and abroad.

			This is Ronald Reagan.

			Thanks for listening.

	</TD>		</TD>
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	<TR><TD WIDTH="150">Batch Number</TD><TD WIDTH="150">{{PAGENAME}}</TD></TR>		<TR><TD WIDTH="150">Batch Number</TD><TD WIDTH="150">{{PAGENAME}}</TD></TR>
	<TD>Production Date</TD><TD>XX/YY/[[Radio1975\|1975]]</TD></TR>		<TD>Production Date</TD><TD>02/14/[[Radio1975\|1975]]</TD></TR>
	<TD>Book/Page</TD><TD>N/A</TD></TR>		<TD>Book/Page</TD><TD>N/A</TD></TR>
	<TD>Audio</TD><TD>Yes</TD></TR>		<TD>Audio</TD><TD>Yes</TD></TR>

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= Détente =

<TABLE BORDER="0"><TR><TD WIDTH="60%" ROWSPAN="2">
=== Transcript ===
Not Available yet. This code is a placeholder.

</TD>
<TD WIDTH="10%" ROWSPAN="2"> </TD>
<TD VALIGN="TOP" HEIGHT="250">
=== Details ===
<TABLE BORDER="0" WIDTH="80%">
<TR><TD WIDTH="150">Batch Number</TD><TD WIDTH="150">{{PAGENAME}}</TD></TR>
<TD>Production Date</TD><TD>XX/YY/[[Radio1975|1975]]</TD></TR>
<TD>Book/Page</TD><TD>N/A</TD></TR>
<TD>Audio</TD><TD>Yes</TD></TR>
<TD>Youtube?</TD><TD>No</TD></TR>
</TABLE>
</TD></TR>
<TR><TD VALIGN="TOP">
===Added Notes===

</TD></TR>
</TABLE>