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=== Transcript === | === Transcript === | ||
When the defense bill was vetoed the reason given was the provision in that | |||
bill for construction of a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. The veto message stressed | |||
the greater cost of a nuclear carrier as compared to the conventional kind. That | |||
was a little less than accurate for a number of reasons, one being that the cost | |||
of the nuclear carrier included fuel for 13 years. Adding fuel cost to the price | |||
of the conventional carrier for those 13 years brings it into the Nimitz-class | |||
price range--but not its battle effectiveness. | |||
What makes the veto hard to understand though is a report to Congress ordered | |||
by the Carter administration making an unanswerable case in support of the giant | |||
carriers. | |||
In fact, there were two studies--submitted early last spring, both of which were | |||
thorough analyses of naval force planning. One was the "Sea based Air Platform", a | |||
study comparing the cost-effectiveness and "survivability" of small, medium and | |||
large aircraft carriers. The second was the "Sea Plan 2000", a study which analyzed | |||
the mission and the needs of the U.S. Navy from now till the end of the century. | |||
The administration delivered these studies without deleting or repudiating a | |||
single recommendation or finding. Then ignoring the studies completely, it submitted | |||
a 1979 Navy budget providing for no carriers at all and a shipbuilding | |||
program be reduced by half. | |||
To say that Congress was surprised is an understatement. The first study said | |||
that the Nimitz-class carrier is individually the most effective and survivable | |||
ship. Its massive armor plate, structural strength and compartmentalization make it | |||
capable of absorbing a great many enemy hits and still keep on fighting. This is | |||
not true of the smaller ships. | |||
The "Sea Plan 2000" study found that our surface ships and carrier battle groups | |||
will become less vulnerable over the next ten or more years. This is laid to the | |||
expectation that three U.S. developments will more than match Russia's advances in | |||
cruise missiles, attack bombers and submarine threat. They are the F-14/Phoenix | |||
fleet air defense system; the introduction of a close-in defense against missiles | |||
that get through the fighter barrier, and improvements in our anti-submarine warfare. | |||
Over and above all, the studies demonstrated that a navy of 13 carriers, and | |||
600 ships in all could take on the vastly improved and increased Soviet navy in its | |||
own waters and win. We are far short of those numbers right now. | |||
Admiral Holloway, who has just retired as Chief of Naval Operations, had | |||
recommended the giant carrier. Secretary of the Navy Clayton said, if Congress | |||
would authorize a big carrier he would build it with enthusiasm. | |||
It is hard to understand the complete reversal of the administration, when its | |||
own studies and arguments were aimed at convincing Congress the nuclear carrier was | |||
needed. Congress was convinced, but the President said, "April Fool", and the Soviets | |||
smile happily. | |||
This is Ronald Reagan. | |||
Thanks for listening. | |||
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Latest revision as of 17:02, 25 February 2026
- Main Page \ Reagan Radio Commentaries \ 1978
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Nuclear Carrier[edit]
Transcript[edit]When the defense bill was vetoed the reason given was the provision in that bill for construction of a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. The veto message stressed the greater cost of a nuclear carrier as compared to the conventional kind. That was a little less than accurate for a number of reasons, one being that the cost of the nuclear carrier included fuel for 13 years. Adding fuel cost to the price of the conventional carrier for those 13 years brings it into the Nimitz-class price range--but not its battle effectiveness. What makes the veto hard to understand though is a report to Congress ordered by the Carter administration making an unanswerable case in support of the giant carriers. In fact, there were two studies--submitted early last spring, both of which were thorough analyses of naval force planning. One was the "Sea based Air Platform", a study comparing the cost-effectiveness and "survivability" of small, medium and large aircraft carriers. The second was the "Sea Plan 2000", a study which analyzed the mission and the needs of the U.S. Navy from now till the end of the century. The administration delivered these studies without deleting or repudiating a single recommendation or finding. Then ignoring the studies completely, it submitted a 1979 Navy budget providing for no carriers at all and a shipbuilding program be reduced by half. To say that Congress was surprised is an understatement. The first study said that the Nimitz-class carrier is individually the most effective and survivable ship. Its massive armor plate, structural strength and compartmentalization make it capable of absorbing a great many enemy hits and still keep on fighting. This is not true of the smaller ships. The "Sea Plan 2000" study found that our surface ships and carrier battle groups will become less vulnerable over the next ten or more years. This is laid to the expectation that three U.S. developments will more than match Russia's advances in cruise missiles, attack bombers and submarine threat. They are the F-14/Phoenix fleet air defense system; the introduction of a close-in defense against missiles that get through the fighter barrier, and improvements in our anti-submarine warfare. Over and above all, the studies demonstrated that a navy of 13 carriers, and 600 ships in all could take on the vastly improved and increased Soviet navy in its own waters and win. We are far short of those numbers right now. Admiral Holloway, who has just retired as Chief of Naval Operations, had recommended the giant carrier. Secretary of the Navy Clayton said, if Congress would authorize a big carrier he would build it with enthusiasm. It is hard to understand the complete reversal of the administration, when its own studies and arguments were aimed at convincing Congress the nuclear carrier was needed. Congress was convinced, but the President said, "April Fool", and the Soviets smile happily. This is Ronald Reagan. Thanks for listening. |
Details[edit]
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Added Notes[edit] |
